App Scam DBBY ALEX KLEBER
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Branding and privacy warning · Authentication utilities

A new icon after launch. A Microsoft-like identity for a paid Mac authenticator.

VISUAL EVIDENCE

This paid Mac app beside the original Microsoft Authenticator

Left: Authenticator App for Desktop by Muhammad Basit. Right: Microsoft Authenticator by Microsoft Corporation. The shared Authenticator wording reinforces the resemblance of the blue lock, shield-like outline and cyan gradients. Together, the name and icon can misleadingly suggest an official Microsoft desktop product. The white tick and panel design differ from Microsoft's person symbol. The earlier purple icon and dated change evidence are preserved below.

This Mac app · Muhammad BasitBlue arched padlock, layered cyan and blue shield and white check mark on a white app tile.
Original Apple artwork for app 6826168444, independently retrieved on 10 November; matches the supplied record.
Original · Microsoft AuthenticatorOfficial Microsoft Authenticator icon: blue padlock-shaped shield containing a cyan person.
Original Apple artwork for Microsoft Authenticator, app 983156458, retrieved 10 November. The official reference is a mobile app.

Another suspected scam pattern has reached Apple's storefront from a seller declaring Pakistan: a generic-looking identity first, then an update adopting familiar third-party branding. This case adds documented evidence of a Microsoft-like icon reaching the Mac App Store despite App Review. Muhammad Basit's Authenticator App for Desktop changed from a purple fingerprint on 8 November to a blue lock-and-shield by 10 November. App Scam DB assesses the combination of the prominent Authenticator name and the Microsoft-like icon as misleading: buyers may mistake this independent paid Mac app for an official Microsoft Authenticator desktop product. The sequence also raises a possible review-evasion concern, alongside mismatched privacy documents. The visible records establish the branding change and the seller's declared location; they do not reveal what reviewers were shown or prove deliberate deception.

Download full dossier · PDF ↓
LOOK FOR YOURSELF

The screenshots tell the story.

The dated monitoring page establishes the icon change. The native Apple capture and seven original promotions show what the new listing advertises. They are listing evidence, not screenshots of an independently installed or tested app.

See all 7 additional screenshots
Authenticator App for Mac promotion with purple fingerprint sidebar icon, example account codes and a Google-labelled code bubble.
Original Apple promotion 1, retrieved 10 November; also in source page 5. Purple in-product identity contrasts with the new blue storefront icon.
One-click copy promotion with example one-time codes.
Original Apple promotion 2, retrieved 10 November. Example codes and service labels are marketing content.
Advertised add-account dialog using QR, file, PDF or manual setup key.
Original Apple promotion 3, retrieved 10 November. No real account secret was entered during this investigation.
Private Vault promotion with a move-to-vault menu.
Original Apple promotion 4, retrieved 10 November. The vault protection is a developer claim, not a verified security property.
Password-protected local export and backup settings.
Original Apple promotion 5, retrieved 10 November: local storage and password-protected backup claims.
Account sorting, category and favourites promotion.
Original Apple promotion 6, retrieved 10 November.
Deleted-account recovery promotion with a Slack-labelled example.
Original Apple promotion 7, retrieved 10 November. Recognisable service labels can describe compatibility; they do not by themselves establish endorsement or copying.
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW

A security product needs a clear identity and app-specific privacy promises.

The icon changed after the app was already available

The supplied comparison records a purple fingerprint on 8 November and a blue lock-and-shield on 10 November under the same app ID. Version 1.1 has brief bug-fix and engagement release notes. Apple independently records its release at 06:32:12 UTC on 10 November. This supports scrutiny of post-launch presentation changes; it does not reveal what the reviewer saw or the developer's private review notes.

E1 page 1; E2/E3.

E1 E2 E3

The Authenticator name and look-alike icon reinforce each other

App Scam DB assesses the combined name and icon as misleading presentation: Authenticator App for Desktop shares the prominent Authenticator wording with Microsoft's product and pairs it with a similar blue lock-and-shield icon. That combination can make an independent paid Mac app look like an official Microsoft desktop counterpart. Apple identifies Muhammad Basit as seller. Microsoft's own support page says Microsoft Authenticator is not available for PC or Mac. This assessment concerns the combined presentation; it does not establish exclusive rights over the descriptive word Authenticator or prove that buyers were actually confused.

Visual assessment of original icons; E2/E4/E5.

E2 E4 E5

Local-only claims meet an unrelated AI policy

The listing says account secrets stay on the Mac, with Keychain storage and no server upload. Its Data Not Collected label sits beside a policy allowing technical collection and describing transmission of text, files or audio to AI providers. It does not explain which of those clauses apply to authenticator secrets, recovery data or backups. This is a disclosure mismatch, not evidence that any secret was actually transmitted.

E1 pages 3, 6 and 13–15; E3/E7.

E1 E3 E7

A second sensitive-data app shares the same account and documents

Esignature-Sign Any Document is on the same Apple developer ID and links exactly the same privacy and terms URLs. Both apps received version 1.1 releases on 10 November, twenty seconds apart. These are direct same-publisher connections. No second Apple account, prior suspension or hidden common operator was established.

E2/E6/E8; Apple exact-ID timestamps.

E2 E6 E8
WHAT IT COSTS

Free download, with monthly, yearly and lifetime purchases

These amounts are displayed by Apple in the US and Irish listings, checked on 10 November and consistent with the supplied PDF. Twelve monthly renewals at an unchanged price total $95.88, about 4.8 times the listed $19.99 yearly option; in Ireland, €107.88 versus €22.99, about 4.7 times. The listing describes auto-renewing monthly/yearly access and a one-time lifetime option. Feature equivalence, purchase flow and actual charges were not tested. Price alone is not proof of deception.

Prices displayed in the saved listing
Purchase optionUnited StatesIreland
Monthly Pro$7.99 per month€8.99 per month
Yearly Pro$19.99 per year€22.99 per year
Lifetime Pro$29.99 one-time€34.99 one-time
WHO IS BEHIND IT?

The name on the listing.

App name
Authenticator App for Desktop
Developer / seller
Muhammad Basit
Developer country · App ID 6826168444
Pakistan · Apple-declared trader business location: Faisalabad; not nationality.

E1 page 3 and freshly checked DE/IE provider disclosures, E3, 10 November 2026.

App Store listing ↗
App ID, version and other identifiers
App Store ID
6826168444
Bundle identifier
com.mb.authenticator.app
Version
1.1 · 10 November 2026
First released
3 November 2026 · Apple release field

The warning pattern: change the identity after release

An already-listed app can acquire a much more recognisable visual identity through an update. That is the relevant consumer and review concern here: a generic-looking fingerprint gives way to an icon reminiscent of an established security product while the app retains its store identity. App Scam DB assesses this as a suspicious post-launch branding change deserving Apple's review.

An earlier App Scam DB investigation documented another Pakistan-declared seller changing a generic study chatbot into a Claude-branded listing. It is a comparison of the observed post-launch marketing technique, not a connection between those developers. The repeated concern is that familiar third-party branding reaches an already-live listing through updates; the evidence does not establish that the initial submissions were deceptive or that reviewers were deliberately bypassed.

The earlier observation is 8 November, five days after Apple's first-release field. It is not proof of the launch-day icon, an entirely infringement-free initial submission, a rejected or bypassed review, or a change in the app's actual code. The version-history entry dates 1.0 to 4 November while Apple's first-release field says 3 November; both fields are retained rather than silently reconciled.

The current promotional images still show the purple fingerprint inside the app. That supports a mismatch between storefront artwork and the advertised interface, but does not prove that all screenshots changed in the update. Only the five fields recorded by the source monitor are presented as observed changes.

Purple icon with white fingerprint and a small padlock.
Before · observed 8 November 2026. Original purple fingerprint icon from the supplied change record, page 1.
Blue arched padlock, layered cyan and blue shield and white check mark on a white app tile.
After · observed 10 November 2026. Original blue lock-and-shield icon under the same app ID.
Earlier generic-to-Claude rebranding investigation

E1 pages 1–7; E2/E3; E14 for the separately identified comparison case. All times are UTC unless expressly stated otherwise.

Recognisable security branding has consequences

The comparison preserves the differences: Microsoft's icon contains a cyan person inside a dark-blue shield-like padlock; Basit's uses overlapping blue/cyan panels and a white tick. The shared arched-lock silhouette, colour family and security-product context are the basis for the editorial resemblance assessment. No automated similarity percentage is used.

Microsoft's official support material directs users to mobile stores and explicitly rules out a PC or Mac version of Microsoft Authenticator. A third-party TOTP app can be a legitimate product, but compatibility with authentication services does not make it Microsoft's desktop product. The Apple seller field is essential to distinguishing them.

Microsoft's brand guidance restricts use of its product icons and misleading implied affiliation. The side-by-side comparison supports a request to review confusing presentation; this investigation has no licence agreement, Microsoft enforcement notice or legal determination establishing infringement.

Microsoft's official download guidance Official Microsoft Authenticator listing

E4/E5/E10. Brand guidance is relevant context, not evidence of an enforcement outcome.

A 2FA vault linked to AI-service paperwork

The listing describes TOTP generation, QR/setup-key import, a passcode or Touch ID vault, Keychain storage, encrypted local backups and thirty-day deleted-account recovery. Those features involve sensitive authentication material. They require clear disclosure of where that material goes and who can access it.

The linked MB Apps privacy policy, dated 20 October 2026, instead describes inputs sent to OpenAI, Anthropic, Google and xAI; possible AWS/Firebase hosting; payment providers; and analytics or diagnostics. These are the policy's statements, not independently detected dependencies. Its references to AI inputs do not identify an actual AI feature in the advertised authenticator.

The live page also retains an editorial note headed Important before publishing, telling its publisher to check whether the described providers and processing match the implementation. That is visible published drafting residue, not evidence identifying who wrote the document or whether AI was used to write it.

The Terms of Use link leads to an MB Apps page titled Term & Conditions, but its body is headed Privacy Policy and carries a different effective date, 29 April 2026. It repeats AI-provider and data-processing material and ends with a Before publishing instruction. It does not provide a clear, app-specific explanation of the lifetime entitlement or termination conditions in its displayed body.

The policy also excludes children under nine while Apple rates the app 4+. A store content rating is not a privacy consent rule, so this is a documentation inconsistency requiring explanation rather than proof of unlawful processing. No app binary was supplied or installed, and no network traffic or real authentication secret was tested.

Native captured MB Apps privacy policy opening, including collection clauses and an AI-model processing section.
Source PDF page 13, original native policy capture. The security app's linked document describes AI services and possible data collection.
Native continuation of the linked policy listing hosting, payments, analytics and security language.
Unscaled crop from the native capture in source page 14, x=0, y=0, width=1280, height=1140. Contact details outside this detail are preserved in the complete source appendix.
What the linked documents explain, and what remains unclear
RecordPublished positionIssue for this product
Apple privacy labelData Not CollectedNot reconciled with the linked policy's conditional collection clauses
App descriptionOn-device secrets, Keychain, no server uploadPolicy does not map those promises to its external-processing clauses
Privacy pageAI inputs and multiple third-party providersNo authenticator-specific applicability explanation
Terms routePrivacy Policy body, separate effective dateNo clear product-specific terms in the displayed document
Linked MB Apps privacy policy Linked MB Apps terms route

E1 pages 6–7 and 13–15; E3/E7/E8. Current drafting notes were read in the freshly retrieved page text; they are not claimed to appear in the earlier embedded source captures.

Muhammad Basit, MB Apps and the second app

Apple developer ID 6824482366 currently lists two apps. The individual seller is Muhammad Basit; MB Apps is the label on the shared legal pages and copyright. No incorporated company, beneficial-owner record or verified social profile was established for this publisher. A common personal name or studio abbreviation is insufficient to merge it with unrelated people or businesses.

German and Irish disclosures identify the authenticator seller as a trader and declare Faisalabad, Pakistan. The Esignature listing repeats the same trader contact fields. This is app-specific declared business-location evidence, not a nationality claim and not evidence of wrongdoing.

Esignature-Sign Any Document, bundle com.mb.esignature.app, advertises signatures, stamps, document templates and watermarks. Its description links the same two legal pages used by the authenticator. Reuse of a generic AI policy is therefore relevant to both a security utility and a document-handling utility. The reviewed signing promotions do not establish an additional copied-brand allegation.

Apple's exact-ID records timestamp Esignature 1.1 at 06:31:52 UTC and Authenticator 1.1 at 06:32:12 UTC on 10 November. The twenty-second interval is a concrete same-account release association. It is not a link to another publisher, proof of fraudulent coordination, or the date the Apple account was created.

Esignature app icon with a multicolour document and a signature panel.
Original Apple icon for Esignature-Sign Any Document, app 6825320157. Same developer ID 6824482366; independently retrieved 10 November.
Esignature promotion showing its signing toolkit, stamps and watermark features.
Original Apple Esignature promotion 1, retrieved 10 November. Product context for the shared-policy finding.
Current apps on the same verified Apple developer account
AppApp ID / bundleFirst-release fieldCurrent version release
Esignature-Sign Any Document6825320157 / com.mb.esignature.app1 November 20261.1 · 10 November 06:31:52 UTC
Authenticator App for Desktop6826168444 / com.mb.authenticator.app3 November 20261.1 · 10 November 06:32:12 UTC
Muhammad Basit's Apple developer account Esignature-Sign Any Document

E2/E6/E9; current developer-software lookup and native Apple catalog. Two current apps is a checked storefront observation, not an all-time total.

Connections: one confirmed account, no verified wider network

The strongest connection is direct: the two apps share Apple's numeric developer ID, seller identity, paired legal URLs and trader contact information. Their bundle identifiers also share the com.mb prefix. Exact identifier and contact searches did not establish a separate Apple account, an earlier removed portfolio, a corporate shell or a prior enforcement case.

The previously reported Google-look authenticator under Mubashir Iqbal and the Authy-name report concerning Ahmad Waheed are relevant comparisons of presentation and disclosure risks. Their different sellers, app IDs and legal infrastructure do not connect them to Muhammad Basit. Pakistan, Gmail, Google Sites, a similar app category and a common name are not evidence of common control.

The Google Sites pages resolve and contain substantial text. The concern is their inadequate fit to the two products and the absence of a separate listed product/support website, not the fact that a hosted website builder was used. No custom domain, historic hosting provider or meaningful domain-registration trail was identified from the checked listing links.

Strength of the observed associations
AssociationEvidenceAssessment
Authenticator ↔ EsignatureSame Apple developer ID and sellerConfirmed same publisher account
Both apps ↔ MB Apps pagesExact matching legal URLs and contact fieldsConfirmed shared published documents
Two 1.1 updatesRelease timestamps twenty seconds apartConfirmed timing; no separate-account inference
Other reviewed authenticator sellersSimilar product category or country onlyNo verified operator connection
Earlier Google-look authenticator investigation Earlier Authy-name investigation

E2/E6–E9/E12. Exact public contact values were checked privately and are not reproduced in the narrative.

The concrete questions for Apple

Apple should review the new icon against its copycat and intellectual-property rules, the consistency of the storefront identity and promotional imagery, and whether the linked documents accurately describe this app's handling of authentication material. Rules 2.3, 4.1, 5.2.1 and 5.1.1 are relevant; the paid options also require clear subscription disclosures under 3.1.2.

Public release notes are not the private Notes for Review. Their generic wording cannot establish that the developer concealed the artwork change from reviewers. The supplied chronology does establish that the new identity reached a live listing after release. No Apple ban, enforcement reason, verified consumer loss or credential theft is established by these records.

Buyers should check the seller before interpreting familiar security artwork as official affiliation. An app holding authentication secrets warrants clear product-specific documentation; this listing's mismatched documents do not provide that clarity.

E3/E7/E8/E10/E11. Editorial consumer warning based on the documented presentation and disclosure issues.

THE FULL RECORD

What else changed?

Five changed fields recorded by the supplied monitor. Earlier observation: 8 November 2026, 06:09 UTC (minute precision). Current capture: 10 November 2026, 07:17:44 UTC. Source risk labels are replaced here with descriptive review priorities.

Compare all 5 recorded changes
Icon Branding concern
BEFORE

Purple fingerprint with small lock

AFTER

Blue padlock and layered shield with white tick

E1 page 1; new artwork independently matched to E2.

Version Recorded change
BEFORE

1.0 · version-history entry 4 November 2026

AFTER

1.1 · 10 November 2026

E1 pages 1 and 7; E2.

Release notes Recorded change
BEFORE

No notes recorded

AFTER

Bug Fixes; Engagement Enhanced

E1 page 1; current Apple listing. Not the private review submission notes.

Size Recorded change
BEFORE

1.6 MB

AFTER

1.4 MB

E1 page 1; displayed sizes, not a binary analysis.

Category Recorded change
BEFORE

Productivity

AFTER

Utilities

E1 page 1; E3.

View the dates and timeline
  1. Esignature first-release field

    Earliest current app on the checked developer account; not the date the account was opened.

  2. Authenticator first-release field

    Apple exact-ID releaseDate; the separate 1.0 version-history entry is dated 4 November.

  3. Earlier purple icon observed

    Minute precision as printed in the source comparison; original time 08:09 UTC+02.

  4. Esignature 1.1 released

    Apple currentVersionReleaseDate.

  5. Authenticator 1.1 released

    Apple currentVersionReleaseDate; twenty seconds after the related app.

  6. New blue identity captured

    Supplied monitor detects five changed fields under the existing app ID.

  7. Independent checks

    US, DE and IE listings, original Apple assets, developer catalog, legal pages and Microsoft reference checked; wider identity searches did not establish a second account.

CHECK THE SOURCES

The records behind this report.

The dossier combines this independent investigation with all 15 original source pages, including dated icons, Apple captures and the linked-policy captures. Additional original Apple artwork and promotions were retrieved independently. No binary was supplied, installed or tested, no purchase made, and no real account secret imported. The supplied file's visible source material remains intact; the source monitor's automated risk labels and comparison scores are not adopted as legal or fraud findings.

Open source files, archive links and checksums

E1 / Complete supplied 15-page change report

Captured 10 November 2026, 07:17:44 UTC. Page 1 before/after; pages 2–4 identity, trader and portfolio; page 5 seven promotions; pages 6–7 description, version history and sources; page 8 continuation; pages 9–12 native Apple captures; pages 13–15 native privacy capture. All pages preserved in the appended source section. Original-source hash independently calculated.

SHA-256: 35abff9f073905155b933e36cc54b5cf6cedf791ebd63b626f1c18b400096590

E2 / Apple exact-ID and developer-software records

Retrieved 10 November 2026, 15:36 UTC. App IDs, names, seller/developer IDs, bundle IDs, release timestamps, original artwork and screenshot URLs. Developer lookup with entity=software returns artist and the same two software records; the macSoftware-filtered request returned only the artist record and is not used to imply an empty catalog.

Open source ↗

E3 / Fresh US, German and Irish authenticator listings

All three exact-ID pages returned HTTP 200 on 10 November at 15:36 UTC. Name/subtitle, blue icon, seven promotions, subscriptions, Data Not Collected label, exact legal links. DE and IE declare Muhammad Basit as trader in Faisalabad, Pakistan, consistent with source E1.

Open source ↗

E4 / Official Microsoft Authenticator and original icon

Retrieved 10 November 2026, 15:36 UTC; HTTP 200. Seller Microsoft Corporation, app ID 983156458, bundle com.microsoft.azureauthenticator. Original 512px Apple-hosted artwork downloaded independently, separate from the reviewed Mac product.

Open source ↗

E5 / Microsoft official download guidance

Checked 10 November 2026. Explicitly describes a mobile app and says Microsoft Authenticator is not available for PC or Mac. Used to distinguish an independent Mac product from an official desktop edition.

Open source ↗

E6 / Current Muhammad Basit Apple catalog

Retrieved 10 November 2026; HTTP 200. Two current app links: 6825320157 and 6826168444. Exact numeric developer identity corroborated by software lookup. No historic ban or additional developer account verified.

Open source ↗

E7 / Linked MB Apps privacy policy

Retrieved 10 November 2026, 15:36 UTC; HTTP 200. Effective date 20 October 2026. Full visible text read, including conditional technical collection, AI-provider transmission, third-party hosting/payment/analytics, under-nine clause and a published pre-publication editorial note. Original morning native capture also preserved in E1.

Open source ↗

E8 / Linked MB Apps terms route

Retrieved 10 November 2026, 15:36 UTC; HTTP 200. Site navigation says Term & Conditions; document body says Privacy Policy, effective 29 April 2026, with AI-services content and a pre-publication instruction. Both app descriptions link this exact route.

Open source ↗

E9 / Esignature-Sign Any Document — related app

Retrieved 10 November 2026, 15:36 UTC; HTTP 200. Same developer ID, individual seller, trader contact fields, copyright and exact two legal URLs. Original icon and five promotions inspected. App-specific document features recorded; no additional brand-copy allegation established.

Open source ↗

E10 / Microsoft trademark and brand guidance

Retrieved 10 November 2026; HTTP 200. Addresses product icons, permission and misleading affiliation. Used as relevant review context; no permission document or adjudication obtained.

Open source ↗

E11 / Apple App Review Guidelines

Retrieved 10 November 2026; HTTP 200. Accurate metadata 2.3, copycats 4.1, intellectual property 5.2.1, privacy 5.1.1 and subscriptions 3.1.2 checked. Private Notes for Review distinguished from public release notes.

Open source ↗

E12 / Exact-identifier searches and historical checks

Checked 10 November 2026. Exact app/developer IDs, support contact, policy slugs and bundle IDs searched against public search results and existing structured report corpus. No supported second-account, prior suspension or corporate ownership connection found. Archive discovery endpoint returned HTTP 503; source-record archive links are retained separately and not claimed independently replayed.

Open source ↗

E13 / Source-recorded Apple archive capture

Archive URL printed in source page 7. Not independently replayed during this investigation. Dated icon comparison relies on the supplied monitoring record, not this replay.

Open source ↗

E14 / Earlier documented generic-to-branded update pattern

Existing App Scam DB investigation, dated 22 October 2026. Saved 13/22 October records show a generic study chatbot changing to Claude/Anthropic wording and coral artwork; seller Anam Shehzadi declares Faisalabad, Pakistan. Used solely as a documented pattern comparison, not evidence of common ownership or confirmed App Review evasion.

Open source ↗